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CONSTITIONAL LAw - FRsT AMENDMENT - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
- FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION - EQUAL PROTECTION - The Supreme
Court of the United States held that, notwithstanding the First
Amendment right of political parties to express the shared views
and ideals of their members, states may enact statutes that ban
"fusion candidacies," provided that the statutes are a reasonable
and nondiscriminatory means of furthering a legitimate state
interest
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997).
In 1994, the Twin Cities Area New Party ("New Party") brought
suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota, seeking repeal of a Minnesota election statute banning
"fusion candidacies."' During the 1994 primary elections, Minnesota
State Representative, Andy Dawkins ("Dawkins"), filed as a
candidate for political office under the banner of Minnesota's
Democrat-Farmer-Labor Party.2 During this same election cycle, the
New Party also nominated Dawkins, by petition, as its candidate
for the 1994 general election.3 Following this nomination, Dawkins
ffied a second affidavit of candidacy, this time as a candidate for
the New Party.4 Due to the fact that Minnesota prohibits fusion
candidacies under Minn. Stat. Ann. section 204B.06, 5 Dawkins'
1. Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 863 F Supp. 988 (D. Minn. 1994) ("Twin
Cities 1). The New Party, a minor political party, sought to list an individual as its candidate
who had already filed as a candidate for another political party, Id at 990. State statutes
provide that candidates for public office may only fie as candidates for a single political
party in an election. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 204B.06 (1)(b), 204B.04 (2) (West 1992).
"Fusion candidates" are those who have been nominated by multiple political parties for
the same elective office. Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F3d 196, 197-198 (8th
Cir. 1996)("Twin Cities I").
2. Tlmmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct 1364, 1367 (1997). The Minnesota
Democrat-Farmer-Labor Party resulted from a consolidation of the state's Democratic Party
and the Farmer-Labor Party. Id. at 1367 n.2.
3. Twkin Cities I, 863 F Supp. at 990. Even though already a candidate for the
Democrat-Farmer-Labor Party, Dawkins accepted the nomination of the New Party. Id. at
990. Under Minnesota law, the New Party could not enter candidates in the primary election;
rather, it was required to nominate by a petition signed by the lesser of 1096 of the eligible
voters in the district or 500 voters. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 204B.03, 204B.08 (3)(c)
(West 1992)).
4. Timmons, 117 S. Ct at 1368.
5. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204B.06 (1)(b) (1992). The statute prohibits a filer submitting an
affidavit for elective office to subsequently file an affidavit for the same office as the
candidate of another political party, Id.
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second affidavit was rejected by election officials.6
In response to Dawkins' affidavit being rejected, the New Party's
local branch 7  filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of
Minnesota's anti-fusion statute.8 Specifically, the New Party alleged
that the statute violated its rights of association guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.9 The district court granted summary judgment0 in
favor of the state," concluding that the statute only slightly
infringed upon the New Party's association rights.12 The district
court, however, held that Minnesota's interests in preventing voter
confusion during balloting and in establishing a method of
determining with certainty how the winner was elected outweighed
the imposition on the New Party's constitutional rights.
1 3
Following the district court's granting of Minnesota's motion for
summary judgment, the New Party appealed the ruling to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.14 A
three-judge panel heard the case, reversing the district court's
6. Timmons, 117 S. Ct at 1368. Election officials would not accept the affidavit
Dawldns filed as the New Party's candidate because he was already listed as the
Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party candidate. Id.
7. Id. at 1367.
8. Id. at 1368.
9. Twin Cities I, 863 F Supp. at 990. The New Party contended that the statute
violated its right of assembly under the First Amendment Id. at 990. The First Amendment
guarantees "the right of the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. CONSr. amend. I. The New
Party further contended that the fusion ban violated the Fourteenth Amendment Twin
Cities I, 863 F. Supp. at 990. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state is
permitted to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
10. "Summary judgment" is defined as "a procedural device for the prompt and
expeditious disposition of a controversy without trial when there is no dispute regarding
either the material facts or inferences that can be drawn from those facts, or if only
questions of law are involved." BLAcK's LAw DIcnoNARY 1435 (6th ed. 1990).
11. Turin Cities I, 863 F Supp. at 994.
12. Id. at 993.
13. Id. The district court analyzed the statute by applying touchstones for determining
constitutional validity set out in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). Id. at 991. In
Anderson, the Supreme Court held that in evaluating state election laws, courts must
consider (1) the importance and degree of disturbance to a First or Fourteenth Amendment
right; and (2) the state's justification for infringing upon the right disturbed. Anderson, 460
U.S. at 789. A court must then determine whether the interest of the state is sufficiently
important to justify the burden placed upon the constitutional rights of citizens. Twin Cities
1, 863 F Supp. at 991 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
Minnesota argued that the statute advanced its interests in: (1) preventing voter confusion
at the ballot box; and (2) avoiding uncertainty in determining the degree of support enoyed
by the prevailing candidate within each party where the votes of multiple parties are
combined into a single tally. Id. at 993.
14. Twin Cities 11, 73 F3d at 196.
Timmons v. TWin Cities Area New Party
ruling. 5 The panel held that the Minnesota statute barring a minor
political party from nominating an individual already listed as a
candidate for the same office by a major political party violated the
minor party's association rights, as provided under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 16 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the
statute imposed a severe burden on the New Party because the
statute impeded the development of the minor party by prohibiting
it from forming partnerships with other political parties to elect
candidates. 17
The Eighth Circuit conceded that Minnesota had legitimate
interests in both preserving a stable political structure and ensuring
that its citizens were properly informed and free from confusion
regarding the ballot. 8 The court determined, however, that lesser
measures could be instituted to protect each of the state's interests
that would reduce the infringement on minor political parties'
constitutional rights.19 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the
Minnesota anti-fusion statute was overly broad, considering the
severity of the burden it placed on the New Party's rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 20
Following the decision of the circuit court, Minnesota election
officials filed a petition for certiorari21 with the Supreme Court of
the United States, which the Court granted.22 The majority opinion,
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed the decision of the
Eighth Circuit.23 The Court's analysis of whether the Minnesota
15. Id, at 200.
16. Id, Under Minn. Stat. Ani. section 200.02 (7)(a) (West 1992), a "major party" is one
entitled to participate in the primary election process because it has secured at least five
percent of the statewide vote in a previous election. Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1368 n.2.
17. Twin Cities 11, 73 E3d at 199. The Eighth Circuit compared this case to Norman v.
Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992). Id. In Norman, the Supreme Court held that if a state's election
law imposes a severe burden on a party's First Amendment rights, the statute can only
survive if -narrowly tailored" to address a "compelling interest" of the state. Twin Cities II,
73 F3d at 198 (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992), citing Eu v. San Francisco County
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)).
18. Twin Cities II, 73 E3d at 199.
19. Id. The court suggested ways Minnesota could preserve its interests while placing
fewer restrictions on the association rights of minor political parties under the Constitutiom
Id.
20. Id, at 200.
21. "Certiorari" is a discretionary judicial device, usually employed by the United States
Supreme Court, to select cases it wishes to review on appeal. BLACK'S LAw DiCTONARY 228
(6th ed. 1990).
22. McKenna v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 116 S. Ct. 1846 (1996).
23. Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1375. Michele L Thmmons replaced Lou McKenna as the
party opposing the New Party when she became Acting Director of the Ramsey County
Department of Property, Records, and Revenue. Id, at 1364.
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statute ran afoul of the New Party's association rights guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments involved balancing the
rights of the political party against the interests of the state.24 The
Court held that the "character and magnitude" of the encumbrance
created by the election law must be measured against the
importance of the interest the state seeks to protect through the
statute.
The Court has previously ruled that laws placing "severe
burdens" on political parties must be "narrowly tailored and
advance a compelling state interest."26 If, however, the Court does
not deem the burden on a party "severe," the standard of review
applied is less rigorous - a state must only show that it has a
"substantial" interest in regulating a particular activity.27 In this
case, the Supreme Court determined that prohibiting the New Party
from selecting an individual who had already filed as the candidate
of another party was not so severe a restriction as to trigger the
higher standard of review.28
The Court reasoned that the statute only prohibited an individual
from representing more than a single political party on a ballot.29
Such a limitation did not prevent the New Party from convincing
Dawkins to decline nomination by the major party in favor of the
New Party's nomination. 30 Under the Minnesota statute, the New
Party, or any other minor party, may select any qualified person to
be its candidate, provided the party can convince the individual to
run for election under that party's banner alone.31 In the Court's
view, the anti-fusion law does not "directly limit the New Party's
access to the ballot," or limit its ability to advance its views by
campaigning for any candidate it chooses.32
Notwithstanding the First Amendment's guarantee of the rights of
citizens to form political parties to put forward shared views and
24. Id. at 1370.
25. Id, (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
26. Id, (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
27. Id, For example, if a statute prohibited a candidate's name from appearing on the
ballot under all circumstances, the Court would probably analyze the statute under a strict
scrutiny standard, because completely blocking access to the ballot is a severe burden. In
order for such a statute to be upheld, it must represent the least burdensome way to achieve
a compelling state interest. Id.
28. Tnmons, 117 S. Ct at 1370, 1372.
29. Id,
30. Id,
31. Id. at 1370-71.
32. Id. at 1372.
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ideals, the Court held that states may constitutionally impose
reasonable regulations on political parties to ensure order at the
ballot box.3 Minnesota argued that its ban on fusion candidates
serves its interest in preventing voter confusion about the ballot
and in maintaining the current political structure within the state.34
The Court agreed with Minnesota that allowing a candidate to be
listed more than once threatened the intended use of the ballot, 3
thereby transforming the election process merely into a political
advertising campaign.3 The state's second interest, that the state
legislature had the authority to determine how best to ensure
political equilibrium within the state, also found favor with the
Court 37 Although the Court did not find either of these state
interests to be "compelling," it found each to be legitimate and
reasonable. 31 Therefore, the Court reasoned that because the
burden imposed on the New Party's association rights was not
severe, the statute was constitutionally permissible.39
Justice Stevens' dissent rejected the majority's view.40 According
to Justice Stevens, although Dawkins already appeared on the
ballot as another party's nominee, the New Party had a
constitutional right to have its chosen candidate's name appear on
the ballot 4 The dissent addressed each of the three premises
advanced by the majority: (1) the burden imposed upon the New
Party is not severe; (2) the statute furthers the state's interest in
conducting the electoral process efficiently; and (3) the state's
interest in maintaining the traditional two-party system is
significant.4
2
33. llmmons, 117 S. CL at 1369 (citing Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v.
Federal Election Conm., 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1996) (regarding the formation of political
parties); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (regarding restrictions that a state
legislature is permitted to place on elections)).
34. Id. at 1372.
35. Id. at 1366 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992), citing Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974) (holding that the purpose of elections is to select a
particular candidate for office)).
36. Id. at 1373. The Timmous Court suggests that allowing a candidate's name to
appear numerous times on the same ballot could lead to the creation of political parties with
names suggesting the candidate's stance on an issue, making the ballot a forum for political
advertising Id.
37. Id. at 1374.
38. Id.
39. 7immons, 117 S. Ct. at 1373.
40. ld. at 1375 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined in dissent by Justice
Ginsburg and, in part, by Justice Souter.
41. Id. at 1376 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1997
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Analyzing the first premise, Justice Stevens asserted that limiting
a political party's choice of candidates, even if the choice only
affected a small number of candidates, was an impermissible
infringement on the party's right to select a "standard bearer who
best represents the party's ideologies and preferences."" Justice
Stevens reasoned that a party's choice of a candidate conveyed
what the party represented to voters and potential future members
of the party." By limiting a party's ability to choose the candidate
that it feels best represents its views and ideals, the dissent argued
that the Minnesota statute also violated the New Party's right to
increase its membership and support within the electorate." The
dissent found that a party's candidate served as its best
advertisement in recruiting like-minded voters." Justice Stevens
further suggested that although not the primary function, elections
serve as an avenue for the expression of political views, and
prohibiting a political party's selection of a particular individual
violated that party's right to free political expression.
47
Next, Justice Stevens addressed the majority's contention that
Minnesota has a significant interest preserving an efficient electoral
process. 8 He believed the state failed to demonstrate this interest,
even though the lower standard of review favored by the majority
required only a showing of a "plausible relationship" between the
statute and the relevant state interest,49 Justice Stevens found that
the voter confusion and ballot manipulation scenarios suggested by
the state seemed highly unlikely and gave little credit to the ability
of voters to deal with fusion candidates on the ballot 5° In Justice
Stevens' view, once a state established practical procedures for
43. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)).
44. Tmmonm, 117 S. Ct. at 1376. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id at 1376 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.,
479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986)). In Taskjian, the Court held that a party's right to expand its
membership and increase public backing for its agenda was a central component of a party's
right of association under the Constitution. Id.
46. Id. at 1376 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1377 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens disputed the majority's reliance
on Burdick v. Thkusfti, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) to support its claim that elections are not
intended as vehicles for the expression of political viewpoints. Id. Justice Stevens asserted
that the Court's holding in Burdick states only that political expression is not a central
purpose of the electoral process. Id.
48. Id. at 1378 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Ttmmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1378 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens contended
that because the burden placed on a political party's rights is significant, the Court should
review the statute under a heightened standard. Id.
50. Id.
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recognizing a political party within the state, that party should be
free to select any candidate it chooses.5' The dissent argued that to
deny the opportunity to make such a selection ran counter to the
right of association guaranteed by the First Amendment.52
Finally, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority that the
maintenance of the traditional two-party system was a significant
state interest served by the statute.53 Justice Stevens argued that
consideration of this rationale was inappropriate for the Court in
this case because the state had not even articulated this interest.
54
In his view, even if Minnesota had presented this argument, the
purpose and effect of the law unreasonably restricted minor
political parties' ability to compete in the process by placing them
in an inferior position relative to established parties.5 Therefore,
the dissent concluded that the Court should have found the law
unconstitutional and affirmed the Eighth Circuit's ruling.6
In addition to joining Justice Stevens' dissent, Justice Souter filed
a separate dissenting opinion. 57 Justice Souter agreed with Justice
Stevens' assertion that under prior caselaw, it was improper for the
Court to consider preserving a stable two-party system as a state
interest sufficient to justify the anti-fusion statute.5 Justice Souter
did suggest, however, that if a state could establish that permitting
fusion candidacies severely threatened the two-party system, and
thus, a stable government, a state might indeed have an interest
sufficient to justify banning such candidates.5 Article I, section 4 of
the United States Constitution provides that the states, through
their legislatures, have the authority to regulate "the Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives."60
The Supreme Court, in 1964, addressed the issue of voting rights
51. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id, at 1378-79.
53. Id. at 1379 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter did not join in this section of
Justice Stevens' dissent, Id,
54. 7mmons, 117 S. Ct at 1379 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Id, at 1376 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1381 (Souter, J., dissenting).
58. Id, at 1382 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter contends that the Court's opinion
in Anderson restricted the consideration of state interests advanced by a particular statute to
those articulated by the state in its argument Id.
59. Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1382 (Souter, J., dissenting).
60. William R. Kirschner, Fusion and the Associational Rights of Minor Political
Parties, 95 COLtx L Rsv. 683, 690 (1995)(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4).
1997
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in Reynolds v. Sims. 61 In Reynolds, the Court addressed the degree
of latitude given to states in enacting statutes that impact voting
rights.62  The state action considered in Reynolds was an
apportionment scheme giving individual votes in particular districts
more impact than votes in other districts.3 The Court determined
that voting was a fundamental right under the Constitution;
therefore, any encroachment of this right "must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized."4
Following Reynolds, the Supreme Court next addressed voting
and association rights in Williams v. Rhodes.5 The Ohio statute at
issue in Williams had the practical effect of preventing candidates
of new parties from appearing on the ballot, even though the new
party might have several hundred thousand members.66 Specifically,
the law provided that the state Republican and Democratic parties
could maintain a ballot position if the party received at least ten
percent of the votes in the previous election for governor.67 The law
also required other political parties to submit petitions with a
number of signatures equal to at least fifteen percent of the total
number of votes cast in the previous gubernatorial race.68 The
Williams Court held that the First Amendment guarantees a
political party's right of association in advancing its political ideals
- the "substantially unequal burden" the Ohio statute placed on
new parties violated this right 9 The only way such a statute could
stand, according to the Court, was if the state could demonstrate
that it enacted the law to protect a compelling interest.70 According
61. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In Reynolds, the Court found a plan drafted by the Alabama
legislature reapportioning the state's legislative districts unconstitutional because the plan
was not rationally related to the population distribution. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 581. As a
result, the votes of some citizens had a greater impact than the votes of others. Id,
62. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561.
63. Id. at 540. The plaintiffs argued that the Alabama legislature, in failing to consider
changes in the configuration of the population within various voting districts, discriminated
against certain districts, violating the Fourteenth Amendment Id.
64. Id. at 561-62.
65. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). The Williams Court addressed a series of Ohio election laws
that essentially blocked the access of new political parties to state ballots (even those with
hundreds of thousands of members) and established political parties with few members.
Wi/tians, 393 U.S. at 23. These state rules also affected the election of members of the
electoral college pledged to support various candidates for President and Vice President of
the United States. Id. at 24.
66. Williams, 393 U.S. at 24.
67. Id, at 25-26.
68. Id. at 24-25.
69. Id. at 30-31.
70. Id. at 31. In Williams, the Court found that the Ohio statute's objectives of
Vol. 36:207
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to the Court, Ohio's interests in maintaining political stability and
avoiding voter confusion were not compelling.
71
In 1972, the Court reexamined the question of a candidate's
access to the ballot in Bullock v. Carter 2 In this case, the Court
found that a Texas statute requiring a candidate for public office to
pay a filing fee to be listed on a primary election ballot violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73 Texas law
provided that the candidates must pay the costs of primary
elections.7 4 Application of this statute resulted in some candidates
paying filing fees up to $8,900 to run for local office.7 5 The Court
stated that if a provision of a state's election law is based on a
candidate's financial resources and the provision has a significant
impact on voting freedom, the statute must be "closely
scrutinized."76 Finding that a filing fee system tended to limit the
choice of candidates available to voters significantly, and that such
a system had a greater negative impact on members of the
community with few financial resources, the Court subjected the
Texas law to close scrutiny.77 In the Court's view, the filing fee
requirement most heavily burdened candidates favored by poorer
voters.78 The Court held that the filing fee requirement was not
"reasonably necessary" to protect the state's legitimate interest in
limiting the number of candidates on the ballot.79 Therefore, the
filing fee was determined to be unconstitutional by the Bullock
Court. 0
Two years after Bullock, in Storer v. Brown, l8 the Supreme Court
maintaining a stable two-party system, ensuring that the winner of the election was the
choice of the majority of voters, and avoiding voter confusion, did not rise to the level of
"compelling state interests." Id. at 31-33.
71. Williams, 393 U.S. at 31-32.
72. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
73. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 141. The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to offer all persons within a state's boundaries uniform protection under the
law. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV. Under this amendment, all similarly-situated persons must be
granted equal protection of the laws "in the enjoyment of personal rights and the prevention
and redress of wrongs." BLAcK's LAw DICIONARY 537 (6th ed. 1990).
74. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 149.
75. Id. at 134.
76. Id at 144. The Court defined "close scrutiny" as an intermediate level of scrutiny




79. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144-45.
80. Id at 149.
81. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
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again addressed the question of how much latitude a state has in
regulating elections.82 In Storer, a California election law prohibited
listing independent candidates on a primary election ballot if they
had been previously registered with a recognized political party
within one year of the election date.83 Two individuals who were
denied ballot positions challenged the statute.8 These individuals
contended that the California law violated rights guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.5
Although the Storer Court recognized that state election laws
could burden a candidate and his party or supporters to an extent
that could violate the equal protection clause, the Court asserted
that no "litmus-paper test" existed for determining the validity of
such restrictions; rather, each case should be judged on its specific
facts.8 The Court applied a balancing test, determining that the
maintenance of a stable political system was a compelling state
interest outweighing a potential candidate's (or his supporters')
interests in launching a campaign for office less than one year
before the primary.8 7 The California statute, therefore, surmounted
the constitutional challenge.8
In Anderson v. Celebrezze,8 the Court addressed a state election
law requiring all independent candidates to file a nominating
petition and other documents eight months before the general
election.90 Supporters of John Anderson, an independent candidate
for President of the United States, submitted his nominating
petition to the state of Ohio two months after the deadline.91
82. Storer, 415 U.S. at 727.
83. Id. at 733. Section 6830(d) of the California Elections Code required independent
primary election candidates to have been unaffiliated with any recognized political party for
at least one year prior to the primary. CAL ELEc. CODE § 6830 (Supp. 1974).
84. Storer, 415 U.S. at 727. Thomas Storer and Laurence Frommhagen were denied
positions on the ballot as independent candidates for Congress. Id. at 724.
85. Id. The candidates claimed that their rights to advance their political goals through
association with other like-minded individuals and further their right of free expression
through the casting of meaningful ballots were severely burdened by the statute. Id. They
further argued that the state had no compelling interest that justified such a heavy burden
on these rights. Id. at 729.
86. Id. at 730.
87. Id, at 735-36.
88. Id. at 736.
89. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). This case involved the unsuccessful attempt of independent
candidate, John Anderson, to be listed on the Ohio ballot in the 1980 presidential election.
90. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 780.
91. Id. at 783 n1. The Ohio Code provided that nominating petitions for independent
candidates be submitted at least 75 days before the date of the general election. Ohio
required that Anderson file his petition for candidacy 229 days prior to the general election.
Vol. 36:207216
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Anderson's boosters challenged the petition provision of the statute
as a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
9 2
In considering Anderson's claim that the Ohio statute was
unconstitutional, the Court recalled its proclamation in Storer, that
no "litmus-paper test" exists for determining the constitutionality of
a state election provision.93 The Anderson Court analyzed the law
by adopting a four-part balancing test for evaluating the
constitutionality of state election statutes.94 First, the "character
and magnitude" of the burden placed on First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights must be determined. 95 A court must then analyze
the asserted state interests served by the statutef 6 If the court finds
the state's interests legitimate, it must then determine whether the
burden on a candidate's (or voter's) constitutional rights is justified
in protecting the state interest97 If the burden is determined to
outweigh the asserted state interest, a court must hold the statute
unconstitutional.9 8
In applying this test, the Anderson Court found that the deadline
for filing placed a considerable burden on independent voters and
candidates within the state, while also encumbering the national
election process.9 The Court conceded, however, that Ohio had
legitimate interests in educating voters about candidates for office,
establishing procedures affecting independent and traditional party
candidates equally, and ensuring a solid political structure. 10° The
Court held that the burdens placed on the association and voting
rights of Anderson's supporters outweighed the importance of
protecting the state's interests, particularly in national presidential
elections.01 In so finding, the Court reversed the decision of the
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3513.257 (Supp. 1982). Ohio contended that this early fling
requirement was necessary to aid "political stability" Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783.
92. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 780.
93. Id. at 789 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 789.
96. Id.
97. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 795.
100. Id. at 796.
101. Id. at 789. Although Anderson involved a candidate's access to the ballot, the
Court considered the impact the statute had on the constitutional rights of Anderson's
supporters. Id. The Court noted that, "the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not
lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some
theoretical, correlative effect on voters." Id. at 786 (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143
(1972)). Regarding the association and voting rights infringed upon by the statute, the Court
stated that all election laws have some effect on voters' rights to advance political ideas
1997
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court of appeals, ruling that Anderson was constitutionally entitled
to a ballot position. 1°2 Thus, the Court reiterated its pronouncement
that even if states seek to protect legitimate interests, they may not
burden constitutional rights beyond what is absolutely necessary to
protect those interests.10
In 1986, the Court issued its opinion in Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Connecticut.104 Tashjian determined the degree to which
states may constitutionally burden the First and Fourteenth
Amendment association rights of political parties.' °6 Specifically at
issue in the case was whether the -authority granted to states to
regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives," under Article I, section 4, of the
Constitution allowed a state to restrict voting rights.106
The statute examined was a closed primary law permitting only
registered members of a political party to vote in that party's
primary elections.107 The Republican Party of Connecticut allowed
independent voters to vote in Republican primaries for statewide
and national offices.'08 Connecticut enacted a statute prohibiting
this practice, but the party challenged the statute, claiming it
violated its First Amendment right of association.109
The Court had previously held that constitutionally protected
rights of association applied not only to individuals, but to political
parties as well. 10 Since constitutionally protected rights were
involved, the Court determined that it must employ the Anderson
balancing test."' The Court found that, by restricting the party's
ability to associate freely during the primary election process,
Connecticut placed a substantial burden on the Republican party.
112
(right of free association) and to cast a meaningful ballot (right of free expression). Id. at
788.
102. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806.
103. Id.
104. 479 U.S. 208 (1986). Julia H. Tashjian was Connecticut's Secretary of State. She
acted as the named plaintiff representing the state's interest.
105. Tas/kian, 479 U.S. at 214.
106. Id. at 217.
107. Id. at 210-11. Only those persons listed on the "last-completed enrollment list of a
political party may vote in that party's primary election. Id. at 211 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 9-431 (1985)).
108. Id. at 210.
109. Id. at 211.
110. Tasijian, 479 U.S. at 214. The Court cited Elrod v. Burns, in which the Court held
that the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights ofassociation apply to political parties, as
well as to individuals. Id. (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
111. Id. at 214.
112. Id, at 216.
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In the Court's view, such a restriction creates a substantial burden
because the primary process is a critical point at which a party can
convert its political philosophy into tangible political gain.113
Turning to Connecticut's asserted interest in maintaining a closed
primary system, the Court noted that, although the Constitution
provides states with the authority to regulate elections, they may
not disregard a citizen's constitutionally protected rights in the
exercise of this power."4  Connecticut argued that it had a
compelling interest in preserving an orderly election system that
justified the infringement of these rights, because closed primaries,
if efficiently administered, impeded the practice of "party
raiding,"115 avoided voter confusion, ensured properly educated
voters (as to the positions of candidates), and preserved the
traditional two-party system of government."
6
Although acknowledging the interests of the state and the
authority granted to it by the Constitution, the Court, nevertheless,
ruled that Connecticut failed to demonstrate that its interests were
substantial enough to warrant the imposition of such a burden on
the Republican party.117  The Court reasoned that because
fundamental rights are involved, a state must demonstrate that an
election law advances substantial state interests in order for the
statute to be upheld."8 As the state failed to make such a showing,
the Court found Connecticut's closed primary statute
unconstitutional.19
Three years after the Tashjian decision, the Supreme Court again
heard a significant challenge to a state election statute based on
constitutional association rights.'2° In Eu v. San Francisco County
Democratic Central Committee, 2' the plaintiffs asked the Court to
determine whether a California election law, forbidding party
113. Id.
114. Id. at 217. The Constitution provides states with the authority to administer the
time, place and manner of elections. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 4, cL 1.
115. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 219. "Party raiding" occurs when a group of voters who
desire to advance the interests of one party, register and vote in concert with a second party
in an attempt to elect a politically weaker candidate from the second party. Id,
116. Id, at 217-24.
117. Id. at 225. The Tshjian Court stated, "[t]he power to regulate the time, place, and
manner of elections does not justify, without more, the abridgement of fundamental right,
such as the right to vote (citation omitted), or, as here, the freedom of political association."
Id.
118. Id. at 217.
119. Id. at229.




endorsement of candidates in primary elections, violated a party's
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 12
In determining the appropriate standard of review, the Court
relying on the Anderson balancing test reiterated in Tashjian,
declared that if any election law "burdens the rights of political
parties and their members, it can survive constitutional scrutiny
only if the State shows that it advances a compelling state
interest."12 3
Applying this reasoning to the facts in Eu, the Court determined
that political parties are entitled to association protection, and that
the endorsement ban is, in fact, a burden on this right 2 4 California
asserted that it had a compelling interest in maintaining a secure
governmental structure, as well as preventing voter confusion and
inappropriate influence; therefore, it was justified in burdening the
rights of the party.125 In response to California's assertions, the
Court held that although the maintenance of a secure governmental
structure was a compelling state interest, the state failed to
establish how the endorsement ban served this interest.1 26 Similarly,
the Court found that voter education was a valid state interest, but
held that California did not make a sufficient showing that the ban
advanced this interest.1 27  The Court concluded that the
endorsement ban statute did not further a compelling state interest;
moreover, since the law burdened the constitutional rights of
political parties, the statute could not survive. 28
In Norman v. Reed,29 the Court discussed the magnitude of
importance a state interest must reach in order to withstand a
constitutional challenge that burdens protected citizen and party
rights. 3° The Court considered whether the Constitution permitted
122. ld. at 216. The California Elections Code provides that no party's "official
governing bodies" may endorse or oppose any candidate in a primary election CAL ELzc.
CODE ANN. § 11702 (West 1977).
123. Eu, 489 U.S. at 222 (citing Tashian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,
217, 222 (1986)).
124. Id. at 224. (citing Tasljian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986);
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976)).
125. Id. at 225-26.
126. Id. at 226.
127. Id. at 228-29.
128. Eu, 489 U.S. at 231-33.
129. 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
130. Norman, 502 U.S. at 289. The Court considered an minois election statute that
prohibited the use of a political party's name in a particular political district if the name had
already been used in another district. I& at 279. The Court held that the state's interest in
ensuring that a new political party had sufficiently broad support was not important enough
to justify the burden on, the constitutionally protected right of association. Id. at 293-94.
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a state to apply more demanding petition requirements to citizens
desiring to form a new political party in voting districts composed
of more than one "political subdivision."131 The Norman Court
returned to Anderson as support for its finding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments guarantee citizens the right to form new
political parties to further their collective interests, but that any
election provision blocking a new party's access to the ballot must
be supported by a showing that the provision advances an "interest
sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation."132
The same year the Court decided Norman, it also addressed the
constitutional implications of a Hawaii ban on write-in votes in
Burdick v. Takushi.'33 The issue in the case was whether a write-in
ban violated a voter's rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 34 A Hawaiian voter challenged the ban when only
one candidate filed to run for the state House of Representatives in
the voter's district, but the voter desired to vote for another
person.135 The Burdick Court ruled that not every infringement on
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights must be subjected to strict
scrutiny.136 Rather, only those statutes that impose "severe"
restrictions on such rights must meet the strict scrutiny standard.137
By contrast, election laws that subject constitutionally protected
rights to lesser "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions," and
can be demonstrated to further "the State's important regulatory
interests" will usually be judged a valid exercise of a state's
authority. 
3
In Burdick, the Court held that, given the leniency of Hawaii's
ballot access requirements,'3 the state's ban on write-in voting
primarily impacted those voters who failed to select a candidate
until less than two months before the election. 14 The Court
determined that the statute did not subject voters to a severe
131. Id. at 279.
132. Id. at 288-89. (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793-794, 789 (1983)).
See also Note, Pusion Candidacies, Disaggregation, and Freedom of Association, 109 H4R.
L REv. 1302, 1311 (1996).
133. See also 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
134. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 434 (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
139. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 436. Hawaii provides three separate avenues for a candidate
to secure a position on the ballot: by petition, by filing as the candidate of a traditional
party, and by filing as an unaffiliated (nonpartisan) candidate. Id. at 435-36.
140. Id. at 436-37.
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restriction on their constitutional rights of free speech and
association; thus, the state need only demonstrate that the write-in
ban advanced an important regulatory interest'
41
Hawaii met this burden by showing that the interests the
legislature intended to support included prevention of factionalism
in general elections and avoidance of the practice of party
raiding. U2 The Burdick Court relied on earlier Supreme Court
holdings to find both these interests legitimate.14 The Court stated
that, usually where the burden on a voter's First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights is slight, the burden "will be counterbalanced by
the very state interests supporting the ballot access scheme." 44
Having established that in this instance the burden on the voter's
constitutional rights was not great and that the interests of the
state were reasonable and nondiscriniinatory, the Court upheld
Hawaii's write-in voting ban.'4
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party represents the
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the degree to
which states can restrict the process of voting and a voter's choice
in political representation.14 At issue in Timmons was whether a
state can constitutionally bar a political party from selecting as its
candidate an individual who already appears on the ballot as
another party's candidate for the same political office. 47 In a
broader sense, Timmons addressed the degree to which states can
regulate their electoral process when such regulations conflict with
the constitutionally protected association rights of political
parties.148
It is in this broader sense that the case is most significant In
141. Id. at 434 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
142. Id at 439-40. On the issue of factionalism, the Burdick Court agreed that the state
had a legitimate interest in avoiding the disruptions that might be caused by a write-in
campaign during a general election launched by a "sore-loser from the primary election. Id.
143. Id. at 439. (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974) on the issues of
factionalism and party raiding; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 n.9 (1983)).
144. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441.
145. Id. at 441-42.
146. TImmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1364.
147. Id. at 1370.
148. Id. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). Although the Supreme Court acknowledges that
political parties do possess the right of free association, the Court reasons that this party
right derives from the rights of the individual party members guaranteed under the
Constitution. Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, Tlmmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. CL
1364 (1997). Therefore, when evaluating possible infringement of a political party's right of
association, practitioners should be aware that the Court has never held that political parties
themselves enjoy these constitutional protections. Id. at 14.
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holding that Minnesota's fusion ban did not violate the New Party's
First and Fourteenth Amendment association rights, the Court
construed these rights quite narrowly. In fact, Timmons may be
read as an affirmative statement that, in the area of election law,
the Court is presently unwilling to expand its interpretation of how
far a state must go to accommodate a political party's freedom of
association. 149
The New Party urged the Court to recognize a First Amendment
right of new political parties to increase their membership and
influence by associating with other parties to endorse a common
candidate. 15° In Timmons, the Court had an opportunity to require
states to modify election statutes to provide greater opportunity for
minor political parties to play a significant role in the electoral
process.151 The Court declared that the Constitution did not place
such a requirement on the states.152 The Supreme Court reaffirmed
its determination that states are under no constitutional
requirement to structure election laws to expand opportunities for
minor political parties to gain stature and influence within the
political arena.153 In fac Timmons signifies that states may
establish election provisions tending to favor the established
political parties, provided that the regulations are reasonable and
not intended to discriminate against minor parties. 154 Beginning in
1974 with Storer, the Court has maintained that no clear-cut test
exists to determine the constitutionality of a state election
provision. 15 In the cases following Storer, the Court's practice has
been to weigh the burdens imposed on voters and political parties
against the state interests that the statutes were designed to
uphold.5 Timmons represents a further refinement of this
balancing test.
Interestingly, the Timmons Court cites Minnesota's strong
149. See Brief for Petitioner at 15, immons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct.
1364 (1997).
150. Id, at 13. Fusion candidacies can be employed as a strategy to convey a political
message, specifically that the party supports a particular candidate through the candidate's
apparent affiliation with the party on the ballot Id, The New Party argued that such
communications were vital to convey the party's message to voters unfamiliar with the party.
Timmons, 117 S. Ct at 1372 (citing Brief for Respondent at 22-23, Tlnmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997)).
151. Timmons, 117 S. Ct at 1371.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1374.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1370.
156. Timmons, 117 S. Ct at 1370.
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interest in maintaining a stable two-party system as justification for
the fusion ban.157 As Justice Stevens points out in his dissent,
Minnesota did not claim that the preservation of the two-party
system was a state interest.15 This fact notwithstanding, Chief
Justice Rehnquist weighed this tacit state interest as heavily as any
other justification in the majority decision to uphold the law.16 The
majority treats the maintenance of the traditional two-party system
and the preservation of a stable political system almost
interchangeably. Such treatment provides insight into the Court's
view of how a state can best achieve a stable political structure.
As the Supreme Court is the forum of last resort in election law
disputes, the Court's interpretation of what constitutes a stable
system has a profound impact on future legislation. In recent years,
the electorate has exhibited a growing frustration with the current
political structure along with an apparent willingness to explore
political change through so-called "third parties" and independent
candidacies. Particularly in presidential elections, the last several
contests have seen significant challenges to established political
parties, most notably with the candidacy of Ross Perot under the
Reform Party banner in 1992 and 1996.160
If this trend continues, it is likely that minor political parties and
independent candidates will increasingly petition the courts to
challenge the preeminent positions now enjoyed by the Republican
and Democratic parties.161 In analyzing statutes that tend to make it
more difficult to challenge the traditional political balance, the
Timmons Court seems to indicate that it will take a more
sympathetic view toward state election laws that maintain the
status quo, provided the statutes are reasonable in their method
and nondiscriminatory in their purpose. 162
The Court will probably continue to employ a balancing test to
determine whether an election provision violates a political party's
157. Id. at 1374.
158. Id. at 1379 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1374.
160. In 1992, Ross Perot finished with 1996 of the votes cast in the presidential election.
Kevin Sack, Perot Backers Keep Control of Reform Party, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 26, 1997, at 18. In
1996, his support declined to only 896 of the vote. Id,
161. In 1992, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to a case challenging a Wisconsin
statutory fusion ban similar to the New Party's challenge in Timmons. Swamp v. Kennedy,
950 E2d 383 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1204 (1992) (upholding Wisconsin's ban on
multi-party nominations and denying a challenge of the ban by a minority political party). Id.
162. Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1372.
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association rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.163
Courts will judge the "character and magnitude" of the burden on
the constitutional right of association against the importance of the
state interests the legislature designed the statute to address.
164 If
the burden on the party's rights is "severe," the Court will apply a
strict scrutiny standard of review.166 Should the burden on the
political party be found anything less than "severe," the Court will
employ "less exacting review" and probably uphold the statute, as
long as an "important state interest" is involved and the regulation
is nondiscriminatory.166
The Timmons Court ruled that prohibiting a political party from
listing its chosen candidate on the ballot when the candidate has
already registered for the office as another party's candidate is not
a severe burden.167 The Court provides little guidance, however, as
to the type of infringement on association rights qualifying as
"severe," other than suggesting that a direct limitation on a party's
access to the ballot may qualify as a severe burden on a political
party's constitutional rights.'68
Thirty-three years ago, when the Court considered Wi//iams v.
Rhodes, it found that an election statute having the practical effect
of banning a new political party from the ballot violated the First
Amendment freedom of association to a degree requiring strict
scrutiny review, virtually assuring that the statute would be found
unconstitutional.169 In Timmons, the Court again faced a law that
could limit a new political party's access to the ballot, but the
Court chose to employ a more lenient balancing test in its
analysis. 170 Although the issues are not identical, it appears that the
Court now takes a more sympathetic view of a state's power to
163. Id, at 1370. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), quoting Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). In order to survive review under a strict scrutiny
standard, a statute must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest. Id. Statutes subjected to strict scrutiny are rarely upheld. Kathleen X. Sullivan,
Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. Cow. L REV. 293,
296(1992).
166. Id (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
167. Timmons, 117 S. Ct. at 1370.
168. Id, at 1372.
169. Williams, 393 U.S. at 31; see also Sullivan, supmu note 165.




It seems clear that the current Court has refused to expand the
association rights guaranteed to political parties to include a right
to procedural alterations. What is less clear is how much deference
the Court is willing to give to state legislatures. The Court has
determined that the proper body to make determinations about
elections and how best to maintain a stable political system is the
legislature, and has given the state legislatures considerable latitude
as to how they may address the task.172
Under Timmons, it appears that the states will continue to be
the source of election statutes.73 From a practitioner's perspective,
however, perhaps the most important thing to glean from Timmons
is that the Court continues to subscribe to the view it articulated
more than twenty years ago, that no simple "litmus-paper test"
exists for determining whether a state statute violates rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment' 74 Although the Timmons
Court declined to establish a "bright line" for determining the
constitutionality of state election statutes, 75 the decision represents
a continuing refinement of election law, particularly as it relates to
the rights of minor political parties.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court's decision in Timmons will
dissuade future challenges to election statutes based on the
association rights provided under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. For the time being at least, it appears as though the
Court is reluctant to expand the rights of those political parties
171. Wi/ iams, 393 U.S. at 24-25. The Court in WiUiams considered a statute placing a
greater burden on new political parties than traditional ones. Id. The Court ruled that when
a "substantially unequal burden" is placed on a new political party, the statute must be
subjected to strict scrutiny. Id. at 30-31.
In Timmonw, the Court examined a statute that barred a candidate from appearing on the
ballot as the nominee of more than one party, but the statute did not prohibit the candidate
from appearing as the candidate of a single party. Tlmmons, 117 U.S. at 1368. The Timmons
Court held that states may burden constitutionally protected rights without triggering strict
scrutiny, provided the burdens imposed by the statute are not "severe." Id, at 1370.
172. Timmos, 117 S. Ct. at 1372 (citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S.
189, 195-96 (1986)) (holding that -[llegislatures ... should be permitted to respond to
potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively, provided
that the response is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally
protected rights.").
173. Id, at 1372 (citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1986)).
174. Id. at 1370 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
175. Id, (discussing the Storer Court's holding that no clear rules exist for determining
whether a state election provision is valid).
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seeking to alter the two-party system that has traditionally defined
political process in the United States.
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